Evidence
Papers, simulations, code, results and supporting analysis.
FP-AMM Evidence
The FP-AMM framework separates two fundamentally different questions in electricity market design.
The operational mechanism coordinates electricity consumption, generation and storage through continuously updated local price signals that respond to the evolving physical state of the network. The investment mechanism recognises the long-run system value created by those operational behaviours and allocates fixed-cost recovery using Shapley theory.
Together they form a complete cyber-physical market architecture linking operational coordination to long-term investment incentives.
Both are built to listen to the real signal: the physical state of the network and the value each participant actually creates, rather than a national average price that carries no information about the street a battery sits on. FP-AMM is the first application of the Enleashed method — first-principles, evidence-driven, iterative systems engineering — to our first mission, energy. This page shows what has been tested so far, and how.
Simulation, not a live trial
What we have shown so far
We simulated a real suburban distribution network with measured household data and derated a cable without warning. Under today's national price, a signal that carries no information about that street, household batteries tripped their own feeder sooner than if they had not responded at all. Under a local price formed from the physics of that street, the same batteries chose to relieve the cable themselves.
This is a computer simulation using measured data. It has not yet been tested on a live network. Figures, the paper and the full method will be published here.
Overall Architecture
Two distinct questions. One coherent market architecture.
Electricity systems require both short-run operational coordination and long-run investment incentives. FP-AMM deliberately separates these problems while linking them through a common physical interpretation of system value. Operational price signals coordinate behaviour in real time. Persistent operational value is then translated into long-run investment remuneration through the Shapley settlement.
FP-AMM Clearing
Does the mechanism coordinate the electricity system effectively?
Demonstrates how electricity is coordinated continuously using sequential request processing, rolling future state and local network constraints.
- • O1 — One-node sequential clearing
- • O2 — Forward flexibility
- • O3 — Network bottleneck
- • O4 — Holarchical coordination
- • O5 — Large-scale sequential clearing
Shapley Settlement
Does the settlement/investment mechanism reward system value appropriately?
Demonstrates how persistent system contribution is translated into fair long-run investment remuneration using Shapley theory.
- • Characteristic function
- • Generator decomposition
- • Cost recovery
- • Consumer allocation
- • Sensitivity analysis
Common Experimental Environment
Both evidence streams are evaluated using the same network-constrained benchmark comprising an identical transmission network, generation fleet, demand profile, physical constraints and temporal resolution. This ensures that differences arise from the market mechanism rather than the underlying electricity system.
Scientific Claims
The evidence programme is organised around a set of scientific claims. Each claim is supported by one or more experiments that test specific properties of the proposed market architecture.
Network-feasible allocation
TestingAllocations must remain within the physical limits of the electricity network.
Locational coordination
TestingThe mechanism must recognise that electricity and network capacity have different values at different locations.
Fair allocation under scarcity
TestingWhen flexible capacity is insufficient, allocation should remain fair over time rather than being determined solely by willingness to pay.
Tested by
System-value investment signals
TestingPersistent scarcity, network constraints, availability and substitutability should be reflected in long-run remuneration so that investment signals align with physical system value.
Tested by
Continuous decentralised coordination
UntestedRequests can be processed sequentially without requiring synchronised central scheduling of every participating device.
Tested by